PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

BANKRUPTCY.

An important decision appears in Powell v. Leavitt,
i5o Fed. 89, where the United States Circuit Court of
P

Tof e

Appeals of the First Circuit decides that

where a claim secured by a mortgage on a
bankrupt's stock in trade was attacked by the trustee
as a preference, whereupon the creditor sued in a state
court to establish the validity of the mortgage, in which
action the mortgage was hell to be invalid as a preference, the creditor's claim was thereby "liquidated by
litigation," and provable as an unsecured claim within
6o days after the rendition of the judgment in the state
court, as provided by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
It is further held that the section with respect to the time
within which claims must be proved should be construed
to mean that if a final judgment be entered within thirty
days before the expiration of a year after the adjudication
or at any time thereafter the claim may be proved within
sixty days after the rendition of the judgment. Compare
In re Kemper, 142 Fed. 210.
Claim: Tim

In Smith v. MotIey, x5o Fed. 266, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit decides
that whether a claimant is entitled to priority
=
d .w of payment from a fund which passes into
oovcrniug

the hands of a bankrupt's trustee on the

ground that the claimant's money was held in trust by
the bankrupt and passed into such fund is not a question
to be determined by the priorities allowed under the
insolvency laws of the state, which are superseded by
the bankruptcy act.
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

In Henderson v. Henrie, 56 S. E. 369, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia holds that where,
Inunucion in under a decree in a bankruptcy proceeding
StIt. Court

in the United States court, land is sold and

a deed is ordered to be made to the purchaser, a state
court is without jurisdiction to enjoin the execution of
such deed upon a bill filed therein by one claiming to
be jointly interested with the purchaser in the purchase
of said property. Nor can the purchaser be enjoined
from acquiring the title to such land. Compare Watson
v. Jones 8o U. S. 679.
CEMETERIES.

In Anderson v. Acheson et al., iio N. W. 335, the
Supreme Court of Iowa decides that where one is perLUMAM
to Bury

mitted to bury his dead in a public cemetery,
even though this be by license or privilege,

he acquires such a possession of the spot of ground in
which the bodies are buried as will entitle him to maintain an action against persons who, without right, disturb it, and such right is not lost by the death of the
licensee, but is transmitted to his heirs. Compare
Stewart v. Garrett, 46 S. B. 427, 64 L. R. A. 99.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Kennedy v.
Meara et al. 56 S. B. 243, that when the state, as parens
in a proper case, through its constiBinding tpatrim,
Childrento
tuted
or agencies,
takes undersuch
its
Service
control officers
an infant,
the law authorizing
child to be bound to service under proper instructions
is not a violation of those provisions of the Constitution
of .this state and of the United States which prohibits
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime after conviction thereof. Compare
School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328,
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CORPORATIONS.

A very important decision of the Court of Appeals
is found in Peel v. London & North Western Ry. Co.,
L. R. (1907) 1 Ch., 5, where it appeared that
Ag ~ o
a controversy had been going on for some
of ,,pUmy Fnds years between the directors of a railway company and a body of shareholders with reference to questions of policy affecting the management of the company:
previously to the half-yearly general meetings called for
February and August, 1905, the directors sent to each
shareholder a circular setting out the facts and views of
the directors and asking for the support of the shareholders at the meeting; with this was enclosed a stamped
proxy paper containing the names of three of the directors as proxies, with a stamped cover for return. The
expenses of printing, posting, and stamping these documents were paid out of the funds of the company. Officers and servants of the company had also been directed
to call upon some of the shareholders with a view to
obtaining their votes for the directors. Under these
facts the court decides in an action by the shareholders
to restrain the company and the directors from such use
of the funds of the company that it was the duty of the
directors to inform the shareholders of the facts, of their
policy, and the reasons why they considered that this
policy should be maintained and supported by the shareholders, and that they were justified in trying to influence and secure votes for this purpose, and, accordingly
that expenses which had been bona fide incurred in the
interest of the company were properly payable out of
the funds of the company. See in this connection Studdert v. Grosvenor, 33 Ch. D. 528.
CRIMINAL LAW.

In Du Cros v. Larnbourne, L. R. (1907), 1 K. B., 40 it

appeared that the appellant appealed to the quarter
sessions against a conviction for unlawfully
Aldiand,
Abett nA
driving his motor car at a speed dangerous
to the ptiblic. At the hearing of the appeal there was a

V6
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CRIMINAL LAW (Continued).

conflict of evidence as to whether the car was being
driven by the appellant or by a lady seated by his side
in the car. The quarter sessions, without- deciding
whether the appellant was himself driving the car, dismissed the appeal, finding as facts that if the lady was
driving she was doing so with the consent and approval
of the appellant, who must have known that the speed
was dangerous, and who, being in control of the car,
could, and ought to, have prevented it. On these facts
the King's Bench Division decides that there was evidence on which the appellant could be convicted of
aiding and abetting the commission of the offence. Compare Reg. v. Coney, 8 Q. B. D. 534.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in State v.
Callahan, ixo N. W. 342, that when the spectators at
Trial:

a criminal trial of lascivious or immoral

Exdus om

character are so obtrusive as to embarrass
a witness during the examination,

and it

becomes apparent to the trial court that the due ad-

ministration of justice is being impeded, the court may
temporarily clear the court room of all persons except
court officers, counsel, and witnesses, and the defendant,
Without infringing upon defendant's right to a public
trial. Although the record does not expressly show a
withdrawal or limitation of the order, it will be inferred
that it was made for a temporary purpose only, and that
it was not enforced after the reason calling it into existence ceased to exist. Compare Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Scarborough, 42 S. W. 706, referred to infra.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Cleveland Electric Railway Company v. City
of Cleveland &C., 27 S. C. R. 202, that the
strec.Ralway Proety right to take possession of the property of a
street railway company remaining in the streets at the
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DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Continued).

expiration of its franchise cannot, consistently with due
process of the law, be conferred by municipal ordinance
upon another street railway company.
EQUITABLE DEFI-NSES.

In State ex rel. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co.
of London, Limited, v. Tanner et al, Councilmen, et al.
88 Pac. 321, the Supreme Court of Washington
t7o
b
decides that the fact that a city's right to
Jugo
affirmatively attack judgments obtained
against it by collusion was barred by the statute of
limitations did not prevent it from impeaching the
judgments in defense of an action founded upon them,
since equitable defenses are barred by neither the statute
of limitations nor laches. See in this connection Hart v.
Church, 126 Cal.

479.

INJUNCTION.

The Supreme Court of Texas decides in Lytle et al. v.
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. et al., 99 S. W. 396, that
a carrier which has determined to sell tickets
Excursion
at a reduced rate for a particular occasion,
Tickets
good for a return trip, but not transferable,
and which has so advised the public, and which has
placed such tickets on sale, is entitled to an injunctioti
restraining any dealing in the return tickets, but it is
not entitled to an injunction enjoining a dealing in such
tickets as may thereafter be issued as occasion may
arise. With this case compare Schuback v. McDonald,
179 Mo. z63, 65 L. R. A. 136.
INSURANCE.

The Supreme Court of Iowa decides in Arispe Mercantile Co. v. CapitalIns. Co., ixo N. W. 593, that where
Powr of
the recording ageni of an insurance company,
Agent
who, as such agent, issued a fire policy, was
one of the incorporators of insured, and at the date of
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!NSURANCE

(Continued),

-,.e policy was a member of its governing body, and did
not advise the insurer of these facts or obtain its consent
to insure the property, and it had no notice of the facts,
the policy is void, under the principle that one cannot
as agent transact business for his own benefit, though
the agent acts in good faith, and the contract is fair and
equitable. Compare Central Ins. Co. v. National Ins.
Co. 14 N. Y. 85.
In Home Insurance Company of Newartr
York v. VictoriaMontreal Fire Insurance Company (i 9 o7),A. C.
Caue Ino1. -59
.al
it appeared that in a contract of reinsurance which was engrafted on an ordinary printed form of fire insurance policy, and incorporated all its terms, there was a clause which purported
to prohibit an action thereon unless commenced within
twelve months next after the fire. Under these facts
the Privy Council decides that having regard to the true
construction of the contract, which carelessly purported
to include many conditions inapplicable to re-insurance,
the above clause must also be regarded as inapplicable.
Such a clause is reasonable in the original policy where
the assured can sue immediately on incurring loss; it
cannot apply where the insured is unable to sue until
the direct loss is ascertained between parties over whom
he has no control. Compare Provincial Insurance Company v. Aetna Insurance Company, 16 U. C. R. 135.
In Lenagh et al. v Commercial Union Assur. Co., 11o
N. W. 740, the Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that
husband and wife have each and both a peInsurable
Interest
cuniary and insurable interest in all articles
comprised in the furniture of their household, or which
are necessary or convenient and actually in use in the
maintenance of their domestic relation, regardless of
whose money paid for them, or by what means or from
what sources they were obtained.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Mitchell v. Brady et al., 99 S. W. 266, the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky decides that where an iron water
pipe constructed on the side of a building
C4.udltlon of

which abutted upon the sidewalk falls by

Pmls

reason of the fastenings of the pipe getting out of repair
and pulling out of the wall, the owner of the building is
liable for the death of a person struck by the pipe while
rightfully on the walk, though the building is leased
to another and the tenant had obligated himself to keep
the property in repair. It is held, however, that the
tenant also is liable. Compare Murray v. McShane,

36 Am. Rep. 367.
MORTGAGES.

The United States District Court, S. D. New York,
decides In re Banner, 149 Fed. 936, that a provision in
a mortgage, following the usual one giving
to a receiver of rents
the mortgagee a right
and profits in case of default, that "the said

Right of
Mortgagee

to Rents

rents and profits are hereby, in the event of any default
or defaults in the payment of said principal or interest,
assigned to the holder of this mortgage," operates merely
as a pledge of the rents, to which the pledgee does not
become entitled until he asserts his right in some legal
form, as by an application for a receiver and a demand
by such receiver. See Frank v. New York etc. Railroad
CO.,

122

N. Y.

221.

NUISANCE.

The Supreme Court of Iowa decides in Spiker et al.
v. Eikenberry, iio N. W. 457, that where persons played
ball on an uninclosed lot without the auInjuncton:
Oro..d
thority or consent of defendant, the owner
thereof, an injunction would not lie restraining him from
permitting the use of his lot for the playing of ball, as
the result of which the ball would probably be batted
upon the premises of neighboring residents. Compare
Seastream v. New Jersey Exhibition Company, 58 Atl.
532.
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NUISANCE (Continued).

In Brown et al. v. Town of Carrolltonet al., 99 S. W. 37,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals decides that where
wooden awnings over a city sidewalk did not
constitute a public nuisance per se, whether
they were so constructed and maintained as to interfere
with the public use of the street, or whether they had
become a menace to the public safety, was a question
of law for the courts; the city having no authority to
declare the same a nuisance and require the summary
abatement thereof.
PARENT AND CHILD.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Fortinberry v. Holmes, 42 Southern 799, that where a mother
left her child with a person who was to supp,,on Is
LOM Parfuls port, educate, care for, and treat it as his

own child, such person stood in loco parentis, and hence
could not be sued by the child for a whipping inflicted
on it, even though the mother stated, when'she gave
the child, that it was not to be whipped.
PARTITION.

In Kinkead v. Maxwell et al., 88 Pacific, 523, the
Supreme Court of Kansas holding that, as a general
rule, every adult owner of an undivided feeWe.
Eat*
simple estate in real property is entitled to
partition,-as a matter of right, decides further that in
such a case, the fact that the co-tenant holds an estate
for life only in the property will not defeat the action.
Compare Johnson v. Brown, 86 Pac. 503.
POLICE POWER.

The Supreme Court of Colorado holds in City and
County of Denver v. Frueauff, 88 Pac., 389, that a city
Res1Ml-ous o ordinance forbidding any gift enterprise, deOcUpations
fined to include the giving of any trading
stamp or other device which shall entitle the purchaser
of property to receive from any person or corporation
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POLICE POWER (Continued).

other than the vendor any property other than that
actually sold, is not justifiable as an exercise of the police
power. Compare State v. Dalton, 22 R. 1. 77,48 L. R. A.,
775PRINCIPAL AND SURETY

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Dieh/l v. Davis
et al., 88 Pac. 532, that if, as surety for her husband, a
wife sign his note and secure it by a mortgage
Release of
Surety
of her real estate, an agreement extending
the time for the payment of the note, which discharges
her personal liability, will discharge the mortgage security also. Compare Wheatley v. Bastow 7 D. M. & G.
261.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Planters'
State Bank v. Schlamp et al., 99 S. W. 216 that where
a bank accepted a note signed by a principal
DIEcha
osfsX
and two sureties, without'knowing to whom
the proceeds were to be paid, but knowing that they
were wanted for a particular purpose, and that purpose
was not the payment of a debt due the bank, and it
retained the proceeds of the note assuring the principal
maker that it would be paid out on his check, but it
afterwards appropriated a part of the proceeds to a
payment of the debt due it, the sureties were released
to the extent of such appropriation.
RAILROADS.

In Attorney-General v. Mersey Railway Co., L. R.
(1907), Ch. D. 81, it appeared that a railway company

owned a railway which ran from Liverpool
to Birkenhead. For the convenience of pasUltra vires
sengers and intending passengers by the railway the company provided 4, service of motor omnibuses
running betwveen their Central Station at Birkenhead
and the residential part of the town. They ran these
omnibuses exclusively to and from the station in conService
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RAILROADS (Continued).

nection with their train service, but they picked up
passengers on the way and carried them for any distance
they pleased on the line of route, and charged separate
fares for journeys betwveen intermediate stopping places.
The company had no express power under their special
Acts to run omnibuses. in an action by the AttorneyGeneral at the relation of the corporation of Birkenhead,
Warrington J. granted an injunction restraining the railway company from carrying on the business of omnibus
proprietors in Birkenhead. Under these facts the English
Court of Appeals with one judge dissenting decides tha,
the omnibus business as carried on by the Company was
not incidental to the undertaking of the railway and was
ultra vires; but, the defendants undertaking (i) to. run
their omnibuses exclusively to or from a railway station
on their line and in connection with their trains, and not
to hold themselves out as.carrying on a general omnibus
business, (2) not to charge separate fares for intermediate
journeys, and (3) as far as practicable to confine their
omnibus service to or from a station on their line, the
Court discharged the injunction. 'The case is very carefully considered and the importance of the decision is
obvious. Compare London County Council v. AttorneyGeneral (1902) A. C. i65.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

In Chehak et al. v. Battles et al, i1o N. W., 330, the

Supreme Court of Iowa holds that an instrument whereby, in consideration of the surrender to them
Centact
for Ad*pton of a child, parties accept the duties of parents
to the child, and agree that it shall have all the rights
of inheritance by law, may -be specifically enforced as
a contract as to the right of the child to receive a share
of the estate, though it is invalid as an instrument of
adoption because not acknowledged and recorded as
required by the laws in force at the time of its execution.
Compare Wright v. Wright, 58 N. W. 54, L. R. A. i96.
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SUBROGATION.

The Court of Chancery of New Jersey decides in Union
Stone Co. et at. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson
Surety

County et al., 65 Ati. 466, that where a con-for the erection of a building for a

-tractor

county defaulted and his sureties completed the performance of the contract, they were entitled to subrogation to the rights of the owner against the-contractor
and against persons claiming liens for materials furnished to the original contractor, to the extent necessary
to reimburse them for -their necessary outlay, but no
further. Compare PrairieState Nat. Bank v. U. S. i64
U.

S.

227.

TAXATION.

In People of the State of New York, ex rel' Albert J.
Hatch, Plff. in Err., v. Edward Reardon, 27 S. C. R.
188, the Supreme Court of the United States
stock
Transfer Tax upholds the validity of the New York stock
transfer tax law of 19o5, holding it valid even as applied
to shares of foreign corporations owned by nonresidents
and though the tax is based on the face value of the
shares. Furthermore it is decided that it is not an arbitrary discrimination in favor of sales of other kinds of
personal property, such as corporate bonds. Compare
Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501.
In Hill v. Williams, 65 AtI. 413, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland holds that a private alleyway is subject
to taxation, and further decides that where
Priate
Alleyway
one conveys lots describing them as bounded
on one side by an alley of a certain width to be left open
for use in common, the alley, which is but a private way,
is properly assessed to the grantor in whom the feesimple title remains, it being no part of the duty of the
assessor or the appeal tax court to separately value the
interests in the alley of the grantor and grantee. Such
private alleyway, it is said, may be sold for non-payment
of taxes thereon though the easement of passage thereover given an adjoining owner be thereby destroyed.
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TRIAL.

In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Scarborough, 42 Southern
706, the Supreme Court of Florida, Division A., decides
Exclusion

that parties to a cause, who are also witnesses

therein, should not be excluded from the
courtroom during the trial of such cause, since it is their
right to be present and to aid in or observe the progress
of the trial. The only person, however, who would be
in a position to complain of this action, would be the
party to the cause so excluded, and no error is committed by the trial court in refusing to order the party
so excluded to come into the courtroom, at the instance
of the opposing party, for the purpose of identification
by a witness.
of Witnesses

WATER AND WATER COURSE.

In McCarter Atty. Gen. v. Hudson County Water Co.,
65 Atl. 489, the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey decides that an act of the legislature
Diversion
whereby it is made unlawful for any persons
or corporation to transport through pipes, conduits, etc.,
the waters of any fresh-water lake, pond or stream of
the state into any other state, is constitutional. Compare State v. Indiana &c. Co., 120 Ind. 575, 6 L. R. A.
579WRIT OF ERROR.

The United States Court of Appeals of the Third
Circuit decides in Cassatt et al. v. Mitchell Coal & Coke
Co., 250 Fed. 32, that where, in an action
Discovery:
Finl Decislon against a railroad company alone for alleged
violation of the interstate commerce act, plaintiff applied for and obtained an order entered against certain
of the railroad officers and employes, requiring production before and at the trial of books and papers alleged
to contain information relative to the granting of rebates,
such proceeding was collateral to the main action, and
the order, in so far as it required production before the
trial, constituted a "final decision," and was reviewable
on a writ of error.

